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I. WHETHER SANDERSON AND FIRST SECURITY ENTERED 
INTO A BINDING IMPLIED- IN-FACT EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT IS A JURY QUESTION . 
In Utah "the determination of whether sufficient indicia of 
an implied-in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for the 
jury, . . . " Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd,, 771 P.2d 1033, 1044, 
(Utah 1989) . 
Other courts similarly hold that questions of employment 
contract formation are questions of fact: 
Generally, courts seek to enforce the actual understand-
ing of the parties to a contract, and in so doing may 
inquire into the parties' conduct to determine if it 
demonstrates an implied contract. "[I]t must be 
determined, as a question of fact whether the parties 
acted in such a manner as to provide the necessary 
foundation for [an implied contract], and evidence may 
be introduced to rebut the inferences and show that there 
is another explanation for the conduct." 
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 
765 P.2d 373, 385 (Cal. 1988) (In Bank.) (citation omitted). 
The general rule is that the determination whether in a 
particular case a promise should be implied in fact is 
a question of fact. Where reasonable minds may draw 
different conclusions or inferences from undisputed 
evidentiary facts, a question of fact is presented. 
"[T]he very essence of [the jury's] function is to select 
from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that 
which it considers most reasonable." We believe that 
reasonable persons could differ in the inferences and 
conclusions they would draw from the [employer's] 
published manual regarding disciplinary policy and 
procedure. . . . The trial court therefore erred in 
granting summary judgment on this issue. 
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Waaenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.f 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 
1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985) (En Banc.) (citations omitted). 
In its attempt to avoid the consequences of this universal 
recognition that formation of an implied-in-fact employment 
contract presents questions of fact, First Security misstates 
facts. First, First Security repeatedly asserts Sanderson 
"understood" there was no implied-in-fact contract between himself 
and First Security. This is not true. The record reflects that 
all Sanderson's testimony on this subject involved only his present 
understanding at the time of his deposition; moreover, First 
Security's counsel extracted that "understanding" only over the 
repeated objection of Sanderson's counsel that those questions 
impermissibly required Sanderson to make present legal conclusions 
regarding the meaning of certain words. (R. 174-75, 178-79). 
Sanderson never testified he had any such understanding at any time 
during his employment with First Security. 
Second, First Security claims Sanderson acknowledged annually 
in writing that he understood there was no contract between himself 
and First Security. Again, there is no foundation in the record 
for this statement. First Security refers only to two "Statement 
of Compliance with Standards" forms signed by Sanderson. (R. 236, 
238). Those forms say nothing about Sanderson's having any under-
standing regarding the nature of his employment contract with First 
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Security. Moreover, PER-91, the referenced document detailing 
those standards, addresses matters such as conflicts of interest, 
outside employment and political contributions (R. 236). 
Sanderson's two statements that he was in compliance with such 
standards have nothing to do with his employment-at-will status. 
Third, First Security claims, at p. 6 of its Brief, that 
Sanderson "concedes that there is nothing in OP 6-5.2 that insures 
that the disciplinary guidelines are mandatory." First Security 
cites no authority for this statement, and there is none. To the 
contrary, Sanderson testified that in his experience First Security 
had adopted OP 6-5.2 as a mandatory procedure to be followed in 
terminating employees. (R. 183-85, 187, 190, 196-97). 
Finally, First Security materially misstates the record when, 
at p. 7 of its Brief, it contends Sanderson's superior, Cummings, 
did not specifically assure Sanderson of a particular job. 
Cummings in fact specifically assured Sanderson that Sanderson 
would keep Sanderson's job. (R. 181-82, 186). 
Particularly in light of these misstatements of material 
facts, jury questions do exist regarding whether First Security 
created a binding implied-in-fact contract with Sanderson either 
through (1) its Manual; or (2) Cummings' oral assurances. 
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A. First Security's Use Of The Word "Guidelines" Does Not Nullify 
OP 6-5,2, 
First Security repeatedly invokes the word "guidelines" as if 
its use magically prevents the formation of an implied-in-fact 
contract. Several state supreme courts have addressed the use of 
this word and have found it fails to have the automatic nullifying 
effect suggested by First Security. 
In Foley, the California Supreme Court considered an 
employer's "Termination Guidelines", which set forth a seven-step 
pre-termination procedure. In determining the employee had pled 
a claim sufficient to go to the jury, the court held "an allegation 
of breach of written termination Guidelines' implying self-imposed 
limitations on the employer's power to discharge at will may be 
sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of an employment 
contract." Id. at 388 (emphasis added). 
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court addressed 
a 250-page Supervisory Manual and 32-page Guidelines. See id. at 
892, 905. The Michigan Supreme Court specifically held "that 
employer statements of policy, such as the Blue Cross Supervisory 
Manual and Guidelines, can give rise to contractual rights in 
employees without evidence that the parties mutually agreed that 
the policy statements would create contractual rights . . . " and 
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"that the Blue Cross Manual and Guidelines of Personnel Practices 
and Procedures establish contractual rights in [the plaintiff] to 
be disciplined and discharged only in accordance with the 
procedures there set forth — that the question of whether 
termination of employment was in breach of the contract . . . was 
also one for the jury." Id. at 892, 895 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 
725 (Ala. 1987), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the "language 
used in [the employer's] handbook is clear enough that an employee 
reading it could reasonably believe that, as long as he worked 
within the guidelines set out in the handbook, he would not be 
terminated until all procedures set out in the handbook had been 
followed, including the reasons and circumstances for termination 
in the handbook." Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added). 
Finally, in Wagenseller the Arizona Supreme Court addressed 
an employee manual containing a four-step disciplinary procedure 
similar to First Security's. That employer's manual contained the 
following language: "These major infractions are not inclusive and 
are only xguidelines' . " Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis 
added) . The trial court concluded that the use of the word 
"guidelines" was "to create, by its terms, no rights at all." Id. 
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding: 
One reading the document might well infer that the 
[employer] had established a procedure that would 
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generally apply in disciplinary actions taken against 
employees. Although such a person would also note the 
long list of exceptions, he might not conclude from 
reading the list that an exception would apply in every 
case so as to swallow the general rule completely. We 
do not believe that the provision for unarticulated 
exceptions destroys the entire articulated general policy 
as a matter of law. 
Id. (emphasis added) . In short, there is no basis for First 
Security's major premise that its use of the word "guidelines" 
magically insulated it from, or disclaimed, contractual liability. 
B. OP 6-5.2 Is Mandatory As A Matter Of Law, Or Requires Jury 
Interpretation. 
The plain language of OP 6-5.2 further establishes it is 
mandatory. Its first clause reads: "First Security follows the 
Managing for Improvement Procedure . . . " (R. 139), Addendum "C" 
to Sanderson's initial Brief (emphasis added). "Follow" means "to 
accept as authority, obey." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1985), p. 479. OP 6-5.2 (R. 139-41), Addendum "C" 
(emphasis added) contains other mandatory language: 
2. The Managing for Improvement Procedure is used 
to deal with two distinct types of disciplinary problems 
. . . 
• * * 
5. Suspension/Terminations resulting from this 
procedure are to be approved by the Division Subsidiary 
Head Office. 
• * • 
6. In situations where employee behavior warrants 
immediate termination, the stages of this process do not 
need to be followed. Termination in these cases must be 
approved by the appropriate division/subsidiary Head 
Office. 
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Similarly, First Security's OP 6-5.4 (R.200) (emphasis added) 
underscores the mandatory nature of OP 6-5.2: 
1. The purpose of the [severance pay] is two-fold: 
• * * 
b. To encourage management personnel to take 
prompt action to terminate an employee whenever 
s/he lacks the ability to perform the duties 
of the position satisfactorily after the 
Managing for Improvement Procedure has been 
followed (refer to OP 6-5.2 for details). 
In Campbell, the Alabama Supreme Court considered language 
far more discretionary than the language of OP 6-5.2. There, the 
"constructive discipline" section of the employee handbook stated 
that if "disciplinary action is necessary, it generally is taken 
in [a specified] order" and that a four-step disciplinary process 
"would generally be followed." Campbell, 512 So.2d at 736 n.5 
(emphasis added). Despite the employer's argument that such 
qualifications made the procedure discretionary, the Alabama court 
held: "The language used in this handbook is clear enough that an 
employee reading it could reasonably believe that, as long as he 
worked within the guidelines set out in the handbook, he would not 
be terminated until all procedures set out in the handbook had 
been followed, . . . " Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added). 
None of First Security's authorities is to the contrary. 
Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 811 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987), 
involved a "sign-off" sheet expressly acknowledging that 
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employment was at will. Id, at 973, Moreover, the manual itself 
in Dell contained an express disclaimer. Sanderson signed no such 
sheet, and First Security's Manual contains no disclaimer. Dell 
accordingly is nothing more than a disclaimer case, and of no 
relevance to this appeal in light of First Security's claim at pp. 
24-25 of its Brief that it makes no "disclaimer" argument in this 
appeal. Tolbert v. St. Francis Extended Care Center, 545 N.E.2d 
384 (111. App. 1989), is similarly irrelevant because the policy 
manual there established no specific procedures to be followed in 
terminating an employee for substandard performance. The Tolbert 
court merely held that in the absence of specific procedures, a 
manual may not constitute of an enforceable contract. JEd. at 386. 
OP 6-5.2 provides specific procedures. The manual in Butterfield 
v. Citibank of S.D., N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857 (S.D. 1989), provided 
only that employees could be terminated "in appropriate instances" 
without notice, and contained no "for cause only" limitation as 
does OP 6-5.2. Id. at 858-59. 
Another of First Security's cases, Shah v. General Electric 
Co. , 697 F.Supp. 946 (W.D. Ky. 1988) is silent on the specific 
provisions of the employment manual at issue, but contains no 
indication that it provided for any progressive discipline of the 
nature set forth in OP 6-5.2. Moreover, that opinion makes clear 
that there was no provision in the manual that an employee could 
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be terminated only "for cause." Id. at 948. Similarly, in Mursch 
v. Van Porn Co., 851 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1988) the court 
specifically commented on "the lack of Na hierarchy of rules the 
infraction of which could lead to discharge . . . [and/or a 
provision] that a discharge would be only for "just cause" ' ." 
Id. at 996 (quoting and distinguishing Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 
Wis.2d 154, 165, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985)). Finally, in Vancheri v. 
GNLV Corp., 777 P.2d 366, 368 (Nev. 1989), there was no employee 
handbook, and it was unclear on appeal whether the disciplinary 
procedure at issue even applied to the plaintiff. Jd. at 369 & 
n.2. 
Obviously, First Security's statement, at p. 19 of its Brief, 
that "Sanderson does not challenge the above authority" is wrong. 
OP 6-5.2 is either mandatory as a matter of law, or, at the least, 
requires jury interpretation. 
C. Enforceable Implied-In-Fact Employment Contracts Can Arise 
Even In The Absence Of Specific Language. 
As noted by the Foley court, if an employer "creates an 
atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of 
specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is 
induced thereby to remain on the job those promises will be 
enforced." Foley, 765 P.2d at 384 (citation omitted). Such an 
"atmosphere" is sufficient to create an implied-in-fact contract 
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because "employers may benefit from the increased loyalty and 
productivity that such agreements may inspire." Id. at 387. 
Accordingly, even if there is no express provision relied on by an 
employee, 
A limitation may be implied if, from all the circum-
stances surrounding the employment relationship, a 
reasonable person could conclude that both parties 
intended that the employer's . . . right to terminate the 
employment relationship at-will had been limited by the 
implied-in-fact agreement of the parties. 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Ida. 622, 778 P.2d 744, 746 
(1989) (emphasis added) . Similarly, " [a]n implied-in-fact contract 
term . . . is one that is inferred from the statements or conduct 
of the parties." Waaenseller, 710 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis added). 
As summarized by Foley: 
[T]he totality of the circumstances determines the nature 
of the contract. Agreement may be "shown by the acts 
and conduct of the parties, interpreted in the light of 
the subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances. " 
Foley, 765 P.2d at 388 (citation omitted). 
Consequently, Sanderson's contract with First Security is not 
defined merely by First Security's simple insertion of the word 
"guidelines". Such automatic nullification of an implied-in-fact 
employment contract would leave nothing of Berube. An employer 
could merely choose to insert the word "guidelines" to prevent the 
formation of an implied-in-fact contract. Such a rule would not 
protect deserving employees. It would only punish stupid 
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employers. Instead, the necessary inquiry is what First Security's 
words and conduct implied, and what inferences the reasonable 
employee would make from those words and conduct, based upon the 
totality of the circumstances. Summary judgment was inappropriate, 
and on remand this Court should direct the district court either 
(1) that OP 6-5.2 is mandatory as a matter of law; or (2) that 
nothing in the language of OP 6-5.2 prevented the formation of an 
implied-in-fact employment contract. 
D. The "Disclaimer" Issue Was Fully Briefed Before The District 
Court, And Was A Basis For Its Opinion: First Security Still Argues 
Disclaimer In Its Brief. 
Inexplicably, First Security states, at pp. 24-25 of its Brief 
that it "does not rely on the statements [of its handbooks] as 
disclaimers'." To the contrary, both First Security and Sanderson 
addressed the disclaimer issue in their pleadings before the 
district court. (R. 67, 101, 124-25). 
Moreover, four pages after First Security's disingenuous 
statement that it does not rely on any statements in the Benefits 
and Standards Handbooks as "disclaimers", it argues, at p. 29 of 
its Brief, that "Sanderson knew from reading the Standards Handbook 
periodically that he could be terminated at any time." Not only 
is First Security playing games with its employees, it is playing 
games with this Court. First Security cannot make the "disclaimer" 
issue go away by claiming in one breath not to rely on it while, 
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in the next, making an explicit disclaimer argument. It is 
unconscionable for First Security to try to remove the disclaimer 
issue from this appeal so it can continue to enjoy the "increased 
loyalty and productivity", Foley, 765 P.2d at 387, generated by 
what it admits is an illusory disciplinary system. 
The authorities in Sanderson's initial brief regarding 
disclaimer are unchallenged. Because the district court considered 
the disclaimer argument, and entered its summary judgment after 
First Security's argument it had "disclaimed" the provisions of the 
Manual, this Court should, on remand, specifically direct the 
district court that none of the disclaimers relied on by First 
Security is sufficient to nullify the implied-in-fact contract 
created by the Manual and by Cummings' oral assurances. 
II. WHETHER CUMMINGS' PROMISES OF CONTINUED 
EMPLOYMENT CONSTITUTED AN ENFORCEABLE IMPLIED-
IN-FACT CONTRACT IS A JURY QUESTION. 
First Security addresses none of the authorities contained at 
p. 24 of Sanderson's initial Brief which establish that whether 
oral promises of continued employment by an employer constitute an 
enforceable implied-in-fact contract are questions of fact for the 
jury. Additionally, First Security misstates once again the record 
on this appeal when it states, at pp. 7 and 26, that Cummings did 
not specifically assure Sanderson of a particular job. To the 
12 
contrary, Cummings specifically assured Sanderson that Sanderson 
would keep Sanderson's job. (R. 181-82, 186). 
None of First Security's three authorities on this issue 
defeats Sanderson's claim. Braig v. Palace Co., 4 IER Cases 1264 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) involved a motion to dismiss, rather than a 
motion for summary judgment. It accordingly considered no facts. 
Rather, the court simply held plaintiffs' action for wrongful 
termination was barred by New York law "because this cause of 
action is not available in the context of an at will employment 
relationship." Id. at 1265. Merritt v. Edson Express, Inc., 437 
N.W.2d 528 (S.D. 1989) reached its result because the plaintiff was 
not assured any particular position. See id. at 530. In this 
case, Sanderson was assured a particular position, his own. 
Finally, in Peters v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 685 F.Supp. 411 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) the employee was discharged during a three-month 
probationary period. See id. at 412, 414. 
Sanderson's authorities on this issue are also unchallenged, 
and his claims that Cummings' oral assurances of continued 
employment created a binding implied-in-fact contract are 
sufficient to present a triable issue of material fact for the jury 
upon remand of this case to the district court. 
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III. THIS CASE PRESENTS THE PROPER OPPORTUNITY FOR 
THIS COURT TO RECOGNIZE AT LEAST A LIMITED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS. 
At the time Berube was decided the existence of a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts had been 
recognized by only "a few courts, most notably the California 
intermediate appellate courts." Berube, 771 P.2d 1033 at 1051 
(Z immerman , J., concurring.) 
Today, however, the supreme courts of the majority of Utah's 
regional sister states have now recognized a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing (the "Covenant") in employment contracts. See, 
e.g. , Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 789 
(Alas. 1989); Wacrenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040 (Ariz.); Foley, 765 
P.2d at 374, 389, 401 (Cal.); Metcalf, 778 P.2d at 748 (Idaho); 
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 
(1982); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 
(1987); Elliott v. Tektronix, Inc., 102 Or. App. 388, 796 P.2d 361, 
365 (App. 1990) (citing, Sheets v. Knight, 308 Or. 220, 779 P.2d 
1000 (1989), and Best v. U.S. Nat'l. Bank, 303 Or. 557, 739 P.2d 
554 (1987)); Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence In Wash., Inc., 112 
Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298, 304 (1989) (En Banc). 
These cases generally establish that the Covenant does not 
require an employer to terminate its employees only for good cause. 
14 
See, e.g., Waqenseller, 710 P.2d at 1040; Foley, 765 P.2d at 400 
n.39: "If such an interpretation applied, then all at-will 
contracts would be transmuted into contracts requiring good cause 
for termination, . . . " Id. 
This appeal does not arise, however, in a purely "at-will" 
context. First Security voluntarily modified the at-will 
relationship when it issued its Manual and when it implemented 
certain employee benefits; that modified relationship is subject 
to the Covenant. When an employer modifies the relationship, the 
Covenant then requires that neither party to that modified 
relationship do anything that will injure the right of the other 
to receive its benefits. See, e.g., Jones, 779 P.2d at 783; 
Waqenseller. 710 P.2d at 1038; Metcalf. 778 P.2d at 749; Elliott, 
796 P.2d 361; Baldwin, 769 P.2d at 303-04. 
Based upon judicial recognition and development of the 
Covenant in other jurisdictions, and the record before it, this 
Court should specifically hold the Covenant applied to the contract 
between Sanderson and First Security in at least two respects. 
A. The Covenant Requires An Employer To Treat Like Employees 
Alike. 
Throughout First Security's Brief it repeatedly argues that 
OP 6-5.2 of its Manual is a meaningless document "which First 
Security Leasing may follow at its discretion." First Security's 
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Brief pp. 20, 22. One court has paraphrased, and rejected, such 
arguments: " [C]ourts have recognized, as we do, that all employee 
handbooks are not simply Corporate illusion[s], "full of sound 
. . . signifying nothing." '" Campbell, 512 So. 2d at 729 
(citations omitted). Similarly, once an employer issues a 
personnel manual, it "cannot be free to only selectively abide by 
it. Having announced a policy, the employer may not treat it as 
illusory." Waqenseller, 710 P.2d at 1037-38 (citation omitted). 
In this case, First Security not only claims the right to 
apply OP 6-5.2 selectively, it in fact did so, picking and choosing 
those employees who were afforded its protections. (R. 91-92; 
109). Sanderson, however, observed First Security's uniform 
adherence to the termination procedures of the Manual, was told to 
follow it, and used it in terminating an employee. (R. 185; 189-
90).x 
In the process of holding the Covenant prevents an employer 
from impairing the right of employees to receive the benefits of 
their employment agreements, the Alaska Supreme Court specifically 
1
 Sanderson's testimony is explicit and unambiguous that he 
followed the procedures of OP 6-5.2 in terminating that employee, 
John Hancock. First Security never disputes that Sanderson did in 
fact follow OP 6-5.2 in terminating Hancock; instead, it evades the 
point by stating only that Hancock "voluntarily terminated". 
(R. 92). In fact, Sanderson's statement that he followed OP 6-5.2 
in terminating Hancock is unrefuted. 
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held that the Covenant requires an employer to treat like employees 
alike. See Jones, 779 P.2d at 789 n.6. 
First Security's own pleadings and affidavits establish that 
as a matter of corporate policy, First Security treats like 
employees disparately, arbitrarily and capriciously. On remand, 
this Court should instruct the district court that in the event 
the jury finds First Security did in fact treat like employees 
differently, in an arbitrary manner, such conduct violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
B. The Covenant Precluded First Security From Terminating 
Sanderson While, Or Because, He Was Sick, 
State supreme courts have specifically held that when an 
employer terminates an employee because the employee had been sick, 
or had used sick leave, those terminations violated the Covenant. 
In Campbell, a case remarkably similar to this one, a six-year 
employee began to experience health problems during the fourth year 
of his employment. Over the next few years he received treatment 
at various hospitals and various diagnoses were made before a 
correct diagnosis was finally made. During the period of the 
employee's sickness his work performance slipped, resulting in his 
being informed that unless his performance improved, he would be 
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terminated.2 See, Campbell, 512 So. 2d at 727. The employer 
claimed it terminated the employee based upon his deteriorating job 
performance. The employee contended that he had talked with his 
supervisor about the employee's deteriorating health, and that his 
supervisor advised the employee to "keep working". Id. In 
affirming the jury's award of damages to the employee, the Alabama 
Supreme Court held that the employer "violated this obligation [of 
good faith and fair dealing] when it discharged Campbell for 
unsatisfactory performance even though it was aware of his physical 
inability to perform satisfactorily." Id. at 738. 
Sanderson's supervisor, Curamings, repeatedly advised Sanderson 
during Sanderson's illness to take all the time he needed to 
recuperate, that Sanderson had a lot of friends at First Security, 
and that when Sanderson was ready to come back to work his own job 
would still be there. (R. 186-87). 
Furthermore, Judd — the person who effected Sanderson's 
termination — had the following exchange with Rob Garff, one of 
the persons treating Sanderson: 
[Garff]: Does he have the time that he can have the 
leave of absence? 
In this case, First Security never gave Sanderson an 
unacceptable rating, and he was never put on probation as required 
by OP 6-5.2. 
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[Judd]: Well, frankly, he pretty much used up all the 
time, but, he's been off a great deal during the past six 
months • . . 
* * * 
[Judd]: But it is your recommendation that he stays away 
from work, is that correct? 
[Garff]: That's my recommendation that he have a leave 
of absence. 
(R. 206), Addendum "D" to Sanderson's initial Brief. Garff 
indicated to Judd that Sanderson would need to be away from work 
for an additional "couple of weeks" to "get himself together." 
Sanderson was terminated the next working day, despite First 
Security's actual knowledge that Sanderson was then unable to 
perform satisfactorily, and despite Sanderson's entitlement to 
additional sick leave. Id. 
On similar facts, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held an 
employer violated the Covenant. During a two-year period, the 
employee was absent for eight weeks, and those absences created 
serious work problems for the employer. See Metcalf, 778 P.2d at 
745. 
The employee sued based, in part, upon the employer's breach 
of the Covenant. The district court granted the employer's motion 
for summary judgment, and the employee appealed. In reversing the 
district court's grant of summary judgment, one justice wrote: 
The conduct of [the employer] in penalizing [the 
employee] for becoming sick, and thereby utilizing the 
sick leave benefits which she had accrued through her 
labors and service, may, therefore, have constituted a 
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breach of the duty which [the employer] owed fairly in 
and good faith to [the employee]. On the record in this 
case, the dismissal of the cause of action for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must 
be reversed because a jury question is presented as to 
whether the covenant was breached. 
Id. at 753 (Huntley, J., concurring). 
In remanding this case to the district court, this Court 
should similarly instruct the district court that if the jury finds 
First Security terminated Sanderson, either (1) with knowledge he 
was physically unable to perform satisfactorily; or (2) to penalize 
him for becoming sick and consequently utilizing the sick leave 
benefits which he had accrued through his labors and service, such 
termination violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
IV. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ARE A CONTRACTUAL 
REMEDY: THE FORESEEABILITY OF SANDERSON yS 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE 
JURY. 
As First Security itself admits at p. 7 of its Brief, Cummings 
made his assurances of continued employment to Sanderson "during 
a period of time in which Sanderson was explaining to Cummings 
[Sanderson's] concerns about his medical and emotional problems." 
Accordingly, First Security has explicitly recognized that 
Sanderson's mental distress damages were "reasonably contemplated 
by the parties" at precisely the time Sanderson's implied-in-fact 
contract arose. Both Sanderson and First Security consequently 
agree that Sanderson's damages were foreseeable. 
20 
The only question presented, therefore, is whether Sanderson 
is entitled to have a jury determine the amount of damages he 
suffered as a consequence of his emotional distress. Contrary to 
First Security's naked assertion to the contrary, Sanderson is not 
seeking emotional distress damages in tort. Instead, the cases 
cited at pp. 32-33 of Sanderson's initial Brief establish that 
reasonably foreseeable damages are recoverable as contract damages, 
and that questions of foreseeability and objective reasonability 
are for the jury. 
Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 
N.W.2d 628 (1984) is not necessarily to the contrary. As noted by 
that court, contract damages for mental distress are recoverable 
at least in cases where the contract is made or meant to secure the 
protection of personal interests. See id. at 630 n.19. Similarly, 
Foaleman v. Peruvian Assoc, 127 Ariz. 504, 622 P.2d 63 (Ariz. App. 
1980) specifically noted that emotional distress damages are 
recoverable for breach of contract when the defendant "was aware 
of the reasons . . . and that the failure of performance would, 
under the circumstances, expose plaintiff to particular 
consequences, . . ." Id. at 65. 
Finally, DeMarco v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 
(Fla. App. 1978) did not even address whether emotional damages can 
be awarded in an action for a breach of employment contract. 
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Rather, DeMarco merely affirmed a dismissal, not a summary 
judgment, on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege the 
elements of a wilful independent tort. This Court, however, has 
already specifically held that mental anguish damages are 
recoverable in an appropriate breach of contract action, and that 
foreseeability "will always hinge upon the nature and language of 
the contract and the reasonable expectations of the parties." Beck 
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) (emphasis 
added). See also, Berube, 771 P.2d at 1053 (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring) (noting that Beck is applicable to wrongful discharge 
cases such as this). 
On remand, this Court should direct the district court that 
the foreseeability of Sanderson's emotional distress, the reason-
ability of his expectations, and the amount, if any, of his damages 
for emotional distress involve contract damages, and present 
legally proper questions of fact for the jury. 
V. NONE OF FIRST SECURITY'S ARGUMENTS ARE RELEVANT 
TO THE DEPOSITION FILING ISSUE: ITS FILING 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, 
All of First Security's argument regarding the filing of 
depositions overlooks the fact that prior to January 15, 1990, no 
rule permitted litigants to attach deposition pages to memoranda. 
See (repealed) Rule 4-501(6), Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(superseded on January 15, 1990 by (current) Rule 4-501(1)(a)) 
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(former Rule providing that M[m]otions based upon depositions or 
supported thereby shall not be heard unless the depositions are 
filed . . ."; (superseded) Rule 2.7(d) Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah and Rule 
2(d), Rules of Practice-Third Judicial District (both superseded 
by former Rule 4-501(6)) (to the same effect as former Rule 4-
501(6)). 
All of First Security's argument consequently addresses a 
different set of rules. Under those former rules, a party was not 
authorized to attach deposition pages to a pleading, but was 
instead affirmatively required to file the entire deposition with 
the court. On January 15, 1990, the procedure became reversed — 
filing was no longer automatically authorized, and deposition page 
attachment to pleadings was authorized for the first time in Utah. 
This Court has recently reaffirmed that it will not "consider 
on appeal depositions that were not considered by the trial court, 
. . . " See, Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P.2d 1095, 1096 
n.2 (Utah 1990). It is undisputed that the district court never 
reviewed any parts of Sanderson's deposition other than those pages 
attached to Sanderson's Memorandum (R. 161-96). The district court 
erred when it permitted the filing of a deposition it had never 
seen. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In its Brief, First Security arrogantly takes the position 
that an employer in the 1990 fs can instill the expectation of fair, 
consistent and predictable discipline in its employees on the one 
hand, while on the other secretly nullifying those expectations by 
the use of a few magic words, most notably the word "guidelines". 
Courts across the country have increasingly held that modern-day 
employees are entitled to more: 
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent 
upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our 
people have become completely dependent upon wages. If 
they lose their jobs they lose every resource except for 
the relief supplied by the various forms of social 
security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon 
others for all of their income is something new in the 
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in 
another man's hands. 
K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Nev. 1987) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis provided by the Ponsock Court). See also, 
Foley, 765 P.2d 407 (Broussard, J. concurring and dissenting) ("a 
job is status, reputation, a way of defining one's self-worth and 
worth in the community"); W. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the New Deal, 119 (1963) ("To be unemployed in an industrial 
society is the equivalent of banishment and excommunication. A job 
established a man's identity — not only what other men thought of 
him but how he viewed himself; the loss of his job shattered his 
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self-esteem and severed one of his most important ties to other 
men.") Employees are not chess pawns. 
First Security's Manual, its oral assurances to Sanderson, and 
its course of conduct all gave rise to (1) Sanderson's justified 
expectations of continued employment; and (2) a binding implied-
in-fact employment contract between Sanderson and First Security. 
That contract was subject to the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
On appeal, First Security no longer claims, as it did in the 
district court, that it expressly disclaimed that contract. 
Instead, it argues that it impliedly disclaimed the Manual's 
mandatory provisions by calling them "guidelines". Berube, other 
applicable authorities, and sound policy permit no such result. 
This Court should reverse and remand this matter to the district 
court with instructions to conduct the requested jury trial on all 
issues presented by this appeal. 
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